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3Authentication & Identity Assurance
Identity Assurance
• What is Identity Assurance?
Identity Assurance is a measure of the confidence that the 
entity at the other end of an authentication event, is who 
they are claiming to be
– Identity Assurance (IA) is a foundational element for 
effective security.
– IA is a pre-requisite for effective identity management, and 
identity management a pre-requisite for robust security
Authentication
• Authentication is the reliable identification of an entity based upon the 
presentation of a previously assigned token
• E.g. An account is created for Student X in the campus directory, the first time the 
student logs into the directory, they are asked to create a new password – this 
password becomes their authentication token
• Subsequently when a student wants to access services on campus, a given service 
will ask which account (e.g. username for Student X) the student wants to access, 
then verifies who the requestor is by asking for their authentication token (in this 
case the password)
• If the requestor provides the correct password for the account, then the service 
assumes that the requestor is in fact the owner of the account (i.e. Student X) and can 
then make further authorization decisions upon that basis i.e. Student X is 
authenticated
Authentication Strength
• Security is like a chain, it is only as strong as its weakest link 
• The strength of an authentication event determines what trust 
or assurance can be placed in the assumption that you are in 
fact dealing with the claimed identity
• The strength of any Authentication event is dependent on the 
following:
– The original process to bind the identity to the authentication token
– The life cycle management and protection of the authentication token by 
the identity
– The infrastructure and protocols used by a service to validate an 
authentication token
– The use of multiple authentication factors to verify identity
Authentication Factors
• Three Factors of Authentication:
– Something you know
• e.g. password, secret, URI, graphic
– Something you have
• e.g. key, token, smartcard, badge
– Something you are
• e.g. fingerprint, iris scan, face scan, signature
Authentication Factors
• Single Factor of Authentication is most common
– Passwords (something you know) are the most common single factor
• At least Two Factor Authentication is recommended for 
securing important assets
– e.g. ATM card + PIN (have + know)
• 2 x Single Factor Authentication ≠ Two Factor Authentication
– e.g. Password + Graphic is NOT equivalent to Smartcard + PIN 
(although it may be better than a single instance of One Factor 
Authentication)
• Without Two Factor Authentication, some secure 
communications may be vulnerable to disclosure
– Especially in wireless networks
Authentication Infrastructure
• There are essentially 2 main factors that impact the assurance 
of an authentication event due to infrastructure
– Is there a secure path between claimant and service for transmitting 
identity credentials
• E.g. TLS for open network traversal or dedicated line owned by the service 
provider
• Integrity of the operating environments at either end of the communications 
pipe
– Availability of trusted and up-to-date validity status of the presented 
credentials
• E.g. Access to authoritative directory for verification of password
• CRLs or OCSP for PKI credentials
Authentication Token Life-cycle
• Another important consideration for the assurance in an authentication 
event, is the management of the authentication token by the holder AFTER 
it was issued
– E.g. for Username/Password system
• Was an Acceptable Use Policy agreed to by the user and if so, is it being followed?
• Has the User shared their password? Are they changing it at the required intervals? 
Are they using strong password characteristics? Did they write down or leave it 
unprotected? Do they avoid shoulder surfers? Did they change their password after 
they discovered it was compromised?
– E.g. for PKI
• Was a Subscriber Agreement agreed to by the user and if so, is it being followed?
• Is the user keeping their private key password protected? Did they move their private 
key to a public location? Are they using the credential for an unsanctioned purpose? 
Did they share their private key with another user? Did they revoke their certificate 
after they discovered it was compromised?
Identity Binding
• The strength of an authentication event is directly dependent on
the original identity binding process utilized when the 
authentication or identity token was issued
– How was the original identity verified?
• What processes were used to ensure the subscriber/user is the rightful 
owner of their claimed identity?
• Was trusted biometric verification used e.g. photo ID or fingerprint from a 
trusted authority?
• How reliable are the sources of identity information?
• Is there a valid reason for the entity to obtained the credential?
– What type of credential was issued?
• Is it resistant to tampering, counterfeit, or exploitation?
• Does it have on-going validity assertion capability?
Authentication Strength
• Security is like a chain, it is only as strong as its weakest link 
• The strength of an authentication event determines what trust 
or assurance can be placed in the assumption that you are in 
fact dealing with the claimed identity
• The strength of any Authentication event is dependent on the 
following:
– The original process to bind the identity to the authentication token
– The life cycle management and protection of the authentication token by 
the identity
– The infrastructure and protocols used by a service to validate an 
authentication token
– The use of multiple authentication factors to verify identity
Authentication Strength Comparison
• The following set of slides is a comparison of 
some common authentication tokens and their 
mechanisms as used on Dartmouth campus
– They are presented in order of strength from 
Dartmouth’s perspective along the Identity 
Assurance continuum
– A brief discussion for each authentication 
token/mechanism is detailed on how it has the 
capability to affect the assurance of transactions 
based upon them
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Password Authentication
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Plain Password Authentication
1. User types address into browser 2. Browser directs to any server responding to that URL
3. Server presents Login Page
4. User enters credentials into browser, and Submits
5. Browser sends credentials to server
6. User is logged in Or  denied based on match
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Plain Password Authentication
• By using an “http” URL, the user has no 
guarantee that they are talking to the correct 
server
• There are no transport protections so username 
and password can be intercepted and stolen in 
transit (wired or wireless)
• A MITM attacker simply pretends to be the server 
(local DNS poisoning) , asks the user for their 
credentials and replays the answers to the real 
server in real time to gain access – the user is 
oblivious to this attack
• If the password is saved in the browser, it can be 
stolen by malware or a malicious user
• A user can be socially engineered to reveal 
username /password to an attacker
• The server knows everyone’s 
password – it is a single point of 
failure for ALL credentials if it is 
compromised
• A malicious server can masquerade 
as any user to any other service that 
accepts the same username/ 
password (MITM)
• The server has very minimal 
assurance that they are talking to the 
original user – the password could 
have been shared, stolen or guessed
• Passwords only 
provide a single 
authentication factor
• Passwords generally 
represent a poor 
binding between 
identity and 
credential
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Server-side PKI Authentication
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Adding Server-side PKI to 
Password Authentication
• Server-side PKI can strengthen password authentication by adding a SSL/TLS 
certificate to the web server and requiring users to connect over HTTPS
• If the server certificate is issued by a Root CA that is trusted by the browser, 
the user is connected to the web site securely and all subsequent traffic 
between the server and the browser is encrypted
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Adding Server-side PKI to 
Password Authentication
The Root CA that issued the web server certificate is 
trusted by both the server and the browser
The name of the web 
server certificate 
matches what the user 
typed into the browser The lock indicates a secure 
connection between 
browser and server
Details about the web 
server certificate can 
be viewed by clicking 
on the lock in the 
browser status bar
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Adding Server-side PKI to 
Password Authentication
The Root CA that issued the web server certificate is 
trusted by both the server and the browser
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Adding Server-side PKI to 
Password Authentication
• If another server tries 
to impersonate the real 
server, the browser 
warns the user about 
the potential deception
• If the Root CA is NOT 
trusted by the browser 
a similar warning is 
provided
• Even if the user 
ignores these warnings 
and continues to the 
web site, the browser 
address bar displays a 
red background and a 
broken lock to indicate 
the untrusted nature of 
the connection
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Adding Server-side PKI to 
Password Authentication
• By using an “http” URL, the user has no 
guarantee that they are talking to the correct 
server
• There are no transport protections so username 
and password can be intercepted and stolen in 
transit (wired or wireless)
• A MITM attacker simply pretends to be the server 
(local DNS poisoning) , asks the user for their 
credentials and replays the answers to the real 
server in real time to gain access – the user is 
oblivious to this attack
• If the password is saved in the browser, it can be 
stolen by malware or a malicious user
• A user can be socially engineered to reveal 
username /password to an attacker
• The server knows everyone’s 
password – it is a single point of 
failure for ALL credentials if it is 
compromised
• A malicious server can masquerade 
as any user to any other service that 
accepts the same username/ 
password (MITM)
• The server has very minimal 
assurance that they are talking to the 
original user – the password could 
have been shared, stolen or guessed
• Passwords only 
provide a single 
authentication factor
• Passwords generally 
represent a poor 
binding between 
identity and 
credential
Risk eliminated
Risk reduced
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Adding Server-side PKI to 
Password Authentication
• Server-side PKI can strengthen password authentication by adding a SSL/TLS 
certificate to the web server and requiring users to connect over HTTPS
• Server-side certificates with TLS provides a guarantee to users that they are 
talking to an authentic web service – providing they trust the Root CA that 
issued the server certificate
• Server-side certificates with TLS provides secure communications between the 
browser and the server once the encrypted session has been established
• A “Man-in-the-middle” (MITM) attack is still feasible, but requires a far more 
complex set up to get the user to ignore the browser warnings about untrusted
certificates
• The only server that can act maliciously is the original hosted service because 
it legitimately knows all the users credentials
• Server-side PKI only provides strong authentication of server to 
browser – the reverse direction authentication is still reliant on the 
authentication protocol being used (in this case, passwords – which 
are quite weak) which can lower the assurance of any transaction
performed using this process 
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Software Certificate Authentication
private
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Using Software Certificates with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• Client-side PKI can replace password authentication when users have a digital 
certificate signed by a trusted Root CA and a corresponding private key
• Software certificates stored in browsers are the simplest implementation of 
client-side PKI
• Client-side PKI operates in conjunction with server-side PKI to provide a 
mutually strongly authenticated session
• Instead of providing a 
username/password 
pair, the user is asked 
to select a software 
certificate registered 
with the browser, as 
their means of 
authenticating
private
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Using Software Certificates with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• Which client certificates are acceptable, is controlled on the server
• The server provides a list to the browser of all the Root CAs that it trusts to issue 
client certificates, that it will in return accept for authentication purposes
• The browser then prompts the user with a list of only those client certificates that 
they have (known to the browser) that the server will accept (based on the 
commonly trusted Root CAs between browser and server)
• Once the user chooses a certificate, the browser asks permission to use the private 
key associated with that certificate, to encrypt a nonce provided by the server
• The encrypted nonce along with the user’s certificate is returned to the server
• The server uses the certificate to 
decrypt the nonce and verify that 
the user controls the private key
• Since the certificate contains only 
public information, and the nonce 
is a one-time-use only, the user is 
able to authenticate without 
revealing their authentication 
token (the private key) – but still 
providing proof of its possession
• If the user does not have any 
acceptable client certificates, 
they are unable to establish a 
secure connection
private
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Using Software Certificates with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• Permission to use the private key associated with a certificate should be enabled 
by a password or PIN – but this is not required, and can only be enforced via 
policy and not technologically with current modern browsers
• If a private key stored in the browser is protected by a password, then this 
technically provides two factors of authentication – something the user has (a 
private key), and something the user knows (a password)
• Some browsers allow back-up and export of private keys, meaning there could be 
many locations that a given private key exists. There is no way to know what 
protections are being used for private keys being stored in this way. This situation 
can potentially lead to a lowering of the assurance in these credentials
• Users who are unable to provide 
assurances regarding ALL copies 
of their private key, effectively 
reduce the authentication strength 
via this method to something 
closer to a single factor of 
authentication – since they can no 
longer guarantee that the private 
key is something ONLY they have
• Restrictions on private back-
up and storage can be 
controlled via policy, but do 
not negate malicious users
private
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Using Software Certificates with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• Client certificates that do not have their corresponding private keys protected by 
passwords (or whose passwords are remembered in the browser), may be 
compromised by malware, used maliciously on the client’s browser or copied to 
another location
• Issuance of client certificates is governed by policies created to ensure a strong 
binding between the authentication token (the private key) and the identity of its 
owner, and also govern how a user should protect their private key through its 
life-cycle. These controls are typically much stronger than those for passwords
• Client certificates stored in software are not as portable as passwords, but provide 
much stronger authentication – they are typically stronger than an equivalent 128 
character password • Users who are unable to provide 
assurances regarding ALL copies 
of their private key, effectively 
reduce the authentication strength 
via this method to something 
closer to a single factor of 
authentication – since they can no 
longer guarantee that the private 
key is something ONLY they have
private
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• By using an “http” URL, the user has no 
guarantee that they are talking to the correct 
server
• There are no transport protections so username 
and password can be intercepted and stolen in 
transit (wired or wireless)
• A MITM attacker simply pretends to be the server 
(local DNS poisoning) , asks the user for their 
credentials and replays the answers to the real 
server in real time to gain access – the user is 
oblivious to this attack
• If the password is saved in the browser, the 
private key may be stolen by malware or a 
malicious user
• A user can be socially engineered to reveal 
username /password to an attacker
• The server knows everyone’s 
password – it is a single point of 
failure for ALL credentials if it is 
compromised
• A malicious server can masquerade 
as any user to any other service that 
accepts the same username/ 
password (MITM)
• The server has very minimal 
assurance that they are talking to the 
original user – the password could 
have been shared, stolen or guessed
• Passwords only 
provide a single 
authentication factor
• Passwords generally 
represent a poor 
binding between 
identity and 
credential
Risk eliminated
Risk reduced
Using Software Certificates with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
private
Very Low Risk
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Using Software Certificates with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• Software certificates replacing passwords as the means of client
authentication, when combined with server-side PKI, can eliminate almost all 
the risks inherent in password based protocols
• Potential for poor protection of private keys through inappropriate (or no) 
passwords can reduced the effective level of assurance on this type of 
authentication, such that it cannot be considered true two factor authentication
• Social engineering attacks must be much more complex to steal the user’s 
password and then subsequently gain access to the user’s private key
• A server has a reasonable assurance that it is communicating with the original 
authenticated user
• MITM attacks while still possible are highly unlikely due to the additional 
factors that must be cater for
• Software certificates as a means of authentication are far superior to 
plain passwords in every aspect – however there is one deficiency 
that they introduce – they are not very portable between multiple 
legitimate systems
• At Dartmouth we mitigate this issue by making it easy to get 
additional certificates on subsequent or additional legitimate systems
private
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Virtual Tokens Authentication
private
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Using PKI Virtual Tokens with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• PKI Virtual Tokens work exactly the same as software certificates from a 
functionality perspective. The user interactions are exactly the same, except 
when the browser asks permission to use the private key associated with that 
certificate, the user MUST provide the password to the Virtual Token.
• The advantage of private keys stored in Virtual Tokens and registered with the 
browser is that strong local password protection of private keys can be 
enforced.
• Virtual Tokens  also 
remedy the portability 
deficiencies introduced 
by software certificates
• Virtual Tokens still 
suffer from the issue of 
being able to duplicate 
multiple instances of 
the private key such 
that the assurance 
factors of this method 
is reduced
private
• A Virtual Token is 
really nothing more 
than a secure software 
container for the private 
key instead of using the 
browser’s key store
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• By using an “http” URL, the user has no 
guarantee that they are talking to the correct 
server
• There are no transport protections so username 
and password can be intercepted and stolen in 
transit (wired or wireless)
• A MITM attacker simply pretends to be the server 
(local DNS poisoning) , asks the user for their 
credentials and replays the answers to the real 
server in real time to gain access – the user is 
oblivious to this attack
• If the password is saved in the browser, the 
private key may be stolen by malware or a 
malicious user
• A user can be socially engineered to reveal 
username /password to an attacker
• The server knows everyone’s 
password – it is a single point of 
failure for ALL credentials if it is 
compromised
• A malicious server can masquerade 
as any user to any other service that 
accepts the same username/ 
password (MITM)
• The server has very minimal 
assurance that they are talking to the 
original user – the password could 
have been shared, stolen or guessed
• Passwords only 
provide a single 
authentication factor
• Passwords generally 
represent a poor 
binding between 
identity and 
credential
Risk eliminated
Risk reduced
Using PKI Virtual Tokens with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
private
Very Low Risk
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Using PKI Virtual Tokens with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• PKI Virtual Tokens are a relatively new product offering from most 
organizations – there are still teething issues being experienced by vendors 
deploying this technology
• Virtual Tokens provide a lower cost of implementation than the next step up in 
authentication assurance level which is hardware tokens
• Virtual Tokens mitigate most (but not all) of the remaining risks that software 
certificates did not address and facilitate portability of credentials which was a 
deficiency that reliance on software certificates introduced
• Virtual Tokens cannot however, provide true two-factor authentication 
because they can be duplicated an infinite number of times and thus are 
vulnerable to offline brute force or password guessing attacks
• NOTE: Virtual Tokens may also come in a 
one-time-pad (OTP) format. These types of 
tokens are more susceptible to MITM than 
PKI based tokens. In the continuum of 
authentication assurance, OPT tokens fall 
close to (but below) software certificates 
due to their password related deficiencies
private
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Hardware Tokens Authentication
private
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Using PKI Hardware Tokens with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• PKI Hardware Tokens work exactly the same as software certificates  or 
Virtual Tokens from a functionality perspective. The user interactions are 
exactly the same, except when the browser asks permission to use the private 
key associated with that certificate, the user MUST provide the password to 
the Hardware Token after having connected the device.
• The advantage of private keys stored in Hardware Tokens and registered with 
the browser is the enforcement of  strong local password protection.
• Hardware Tokens  also 
remedy the portability 
deficiencies introduced 
by software certificates
• Hardware Tokens 
restrict the export of 
private keys such that 
two factor authentication 
can be achieved
private
• A Hardware Token is a 
secure  container for 
the private key instead 
of using the browser’s 
key store
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• By using an “http” URL, the user has no 
guarantee that they are talking to the correct 
server
• There are no transport protections so username 
and password can be intercepted and stolen in 
transit (wired or wireless)
• A MITM attacker simply pretends to be the server 
(local DNS poisoning) , asks the user for their 
credentials and replays the answers to the real 
server in real time to gain access – the user is 
oblivious to this attack
• If the password is saved in the browser, the 
private key may be stolen by malware or a 
malicious user
• A user can be socially engineered to reveal 
private key password to an attacker
• The server knows everyone’s 
password – it is a single point of 
failure for ALL credentials if it is 
compromised
• A malicious server can masquerade 
as any user to any other service that 
accepts the same username/ 
password (MITM)
• The server has very minimal 
assurance that they are talking to the 
original user – the password could 
have been shared, stolen or guessed
• Passwords only 
provide a single 
authentication factor
• Passwords generally 
represent a poor 
binding between 
identity and 
credential
Risk eliminated
Risk reduced
Using PKI Hardware Tokens with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
private
Very Low Risk
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Using PKI Hardware Tokens with 
Server-side PKI for Authentication
• PKI Hardware Tokens are a mature technology that is well regulated – the 
FIPS 140 Standard (about to release version3) provides ratings for 
cryptographic devices of which Hardware Tokens are a subset 
• Hardware Tokens require a higher initial cost of implementation than other 
options discussed here, but this may be offset by the cost of higher helpdesk 
support for other options e.g. password resets, revocation of certificates due to 
lost files or compromised passwords
• Hardware Tokens mitigate or solve all risks that software certificates did not 
address and yet facilitate portability of credentials which was a deficiency that 
reliance on software certificates introduced
• Hardware Tokens provide true two-factor authentication for the highest level 
of assurance in authentications of any method discussed
• NOTE: PCI and HIPAA both require two 
factor authentication under certain 
circumstances. Hardware Tokens are the 
only authentication technology currently in 
operation at Dartmouth that can provide this
private
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Hardware Tokens provide 
Portability for PKI Private Keys
• Hardware based private key stores 
provide cross-browser and cross-
platform interoperability
– PCMCIA, Smartcard or USB form 
factors available
– USB was Dartmouth’s choice 
because it is relatively ubiquitous 
and does NOT require the 
installation of additional hardware 
i.e. card readers
– Aladdin eTokens were chosen 
because they best supported the 
range of platforms Dartmouth 
wished to support (i.e. Windows, 
Mac, Linux)
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eTokens provide the Strongest 
Protection of PKI Private Keys
• Hardware private key stores provide 
enforcement of private key security
– Hardware devices can ensure that only 
one copy of the key exists – it is 
generated in hardware and cannot be 
exported (never leaves the token)
– Hardware devices can ensure that 
applications do not have direct access to 
private keys 
– Hardware devices can ensure that 
passwords are set to protect private keys, 
and can limit attempts to guess them
– Because of portability functionality of 
hardware devices (detailed previously), 
there is no need for users to manage 
import and export between locations
– Aladdin eTokens were chosen because 
they are FIPS 140 level 3 certified 
hardware devices
41
Summary
Identity Assurance is a measure of the confidence that the entity at 
the other end of an authentication event, is who they are 
claiming to be
– Identity Assurance is a pre-requisite for effective identity management, 
and identity management a pre-requisite for robust security
– The strength of any Authentication event is dependent on the following:
• The original process to bind the identity to the authentication token
• The life cycle management and protection of the authentication token by the 
identity
• The infrastructure and protocols used by a service to validate an 
authentication token
• The use of multiple authentication factors to verify identity
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Summary
• A flexible identity management infrastructure should support different 
levels of authentication – including:
– High assurance credentials on hardware tokens
– Medium assurance credentials on virtual tokens
– Low assurance credentials with PKI software certificates
– Rudimentary assurance password based credentials
• It is recommended that institutions of higher education move away from 
password based authentication as soon as possible (where practical) for any 
type of sensitive data access
While debate continues on what type of technology is best suited to prevent 
identity theft, many experts believe that a combination of PKI infrastructure 
and two-factor authentication offers the greatest promise of protection.
Source: Financial Services Technology, Preventing Identity Theft
43
Questions?
For more information…
Scott Rea - Scott.Rea@dartmouth.edu
